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Abstract— The rapid growth in the demand for Future 
Internet services with many emerging group applications has 
driven the development of satellite, which is the preferred 
delivery mechanism due to its wide area coverage, multicasting 
capability and speed to deliver affordable future services. 
Nevertheless, security has been one of the obstacles for both 
satellite services as well as smart grid group applications, 
especially with logical/geographical/cryptographic domains 
spanning heterogeneous networks and regions. In this paper, 
adaptive security architecture is implemented to protect 
satellite services for smart grid group applications. The focus is 
on key management and policy provisioning.  Leveraging 
Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) as the standard for 
smart grid centralized key/policy management architecture, a 
single Domain of Interpretation (DOI) is deployed and 
evaluated critically in terms of the added protocol signaling 
overhead on the satellite system for a fixed-network scenario. 
This also partially realizes the growing trend towards the use 
of TCP/IP technology for smart grid applications. 
Keywords—satellite systems; secure group communications; 
policy; key management; smart grid; GDOI 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As an integral part of the Future Internet, satellites and 
their broadcast characteristics can be utilized to provide an 
economical wide-area multicast service. On the other hand, 
group-oriented applications with multicasting capacity are 
progressively deployed more and more at the Internet scale. 
Developing any-to-any distributed applications in essence is 
preferred with multicast development [1]. Smart grid 
applications for instance, require secure multicast 
communication covering large geographical areas and hence 
satellite networking is ideal for providing such connectivity 
especially for rural or difficult locations. However, security 
for the group-oriented applications in which a group spans 
multiple logical/geographical/cryptographic domains 
remains the Achilles heel.  
Our previous work in [2] detailed three different 
scenarios, namely mobile-network scenario for the 
applications such as mobile broadband, fixed-network 
scenario with smart grid applications and finally Delay 
Tolerant Network (DTN) scenario with deep-space 
application; and a scalable and adaptable security 
architecture was proposed to ensure the security of satellite 
services. Nevertheless, as [2] reflects as the future direction, 
a secure group management protocol needs to be 
implemented/critically evaluated amongst all the involving 
entities such as senders/receivers and key/policy managers. 
In this work, we aim to clarify security ambiguities regarding 
key/policy management protocol over unicast/multicast 
conduits with empirical studies. Our practical studies here 
provide sufficient support to the previously presented 
approach by demarcating how a centralized architecture with 
secure key/policy management in the fixed-network scenario 
with smart grid application is deployed/evaluated in practice. 
For this, section II discusses how smart grid and satellite 
networking complement each other. Section III overviews 
the security obstacles along the way and shows the direction 
of this work to remove them. Section IV then introduces our 
fixed-network smart grid architecture with satellite and more 
importantly stresses the role of secure group management 
protocol within the satellite domain. Emulation scenario and 
its experimental results are provided in section V. Section VI 
critically evaluates the performance of the results in section 
V. Section VII draws the main conclusions and reflects on 
the future directions of this study. 
II. SMART GRID AND SATELLITE NETWORKING 
Based on [3], supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) in addition to the teleprotection and video 
surveillance are known as the three significant applications 
amongst smart grid established applications. By means of the 
former, power grid field data is acquired and transferred to 
the central systems for monitoring/controlling grid 
components/sensors. The teleprotection refers to the 
mechanism by which detecting a fault raises the alarm for the 
other end(s).  Having said that, for best practice, power grid 
utility companies separate the control network (management 
platform for SCADA, teleprotection or surveillance 
applications) from the corporate network in the production 
environment (customer-related applications).
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Fig. 1. Fixed-network scenario with smart grid application
Considering the rising tendency towards the use of 
TCP/IP technology for the smart grid, utility corporations 
may deploy multiple communication systems while IP 
remains the most common management platform. Network 
segmentation and traffic separation are generally performed 
herein with the aid of virtual private networks (VPNs) [3]. 
Hence remote access through external networks is required 
to be encrypted and access-list protected exploiting IPsec [4] 
and group-based encryption.  In terms of large geographical 
areas, smart grid needs secure multicast means of 
communication with widespread coverage. Satellites are 
therefore an ideal solution for communications amongst 
remote substations within the smart grid infrastructure. 
 In addition to the widespread coverage over the remote 
substations (placed in difficult locations for instance), 
satellite becomes a viable option for different smart grid 
applications since [5]: 
 Robust security is crucial for smart grids. 
Provisioning broadband services by satellites to 
remote substations gives rise to the development of 
security related applications such as video 
surveillance or teleprotection. 
 Satellite backs up terrestrial communications for 
critical grid infrastructure and provides redundancy. 
 For emergency response for disaster recovery, 
satellite ensures business connectivity for the smart 
grid. 
 For areas ill-served by the Internet technologies, 
enhanced metering infrastructure can benefit from 
satellites by backhauling from meter aggregation 
gateways. 
 Satellites can address monitoring/controlling 
requirements for the smart grids and perform 
distribution nodes management. 
It is noteworthy that the definition of remote sites within 
smart grid is not merely limited to the locations which are 
geographically spread over far areas. Sites can be 
economically remote (and thus satellite services are 
essential) whereby installation costs for alternative solutions 
are high or their deployments are unfeasible (due to the 
interference issues, site restrictions or their 
logically/cryptographically heterogeneous nature for 
example). 
III. SECURITY ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES 
It should be noted that our work needs to think through 
security challenges inherent to both satellite services as well 
as smart grids conjointly. Firstly, the applicability of 
remedies for the smart grid in terms of communication 
mechanisms and its overall security still remains an open 
challenge [6]. Smart grid distribution networks based on the 
communication type are susceptible to different threats 
including passive/active eavesdropping, protocol failures, 
DoS or man-in-the-middle attacks and thus enhancing the 
cyber security of the future grid infrastructure is vital [7]. 
Parallel to security, privacy of the information metered is 
another challenging issue in the smart grids [8]. [9] stresses 
that by sending fake commands to smart meters or a group of 
them in a region by an adversary, human life can be 
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threatened through stopping power delivery or invalid 
switching of electric devices. 
On the other hand, active threats such as masquerading or 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) against the security of satellite 
services are more difficult for implementation than the 
passive threats. However, because of the broadcast nature of 
satellites, eavesdropping and traffic analysis are deemed to 
be the major passive threats for different satellite 
applications [10]. To thwart such passive threats, we later 
reveal how incorporating the security mechanisms within the 
satellite domain provides the ability for centralized key 
management and policy generation and eliminates the 
associated eavesdropping risks. 
Considering [2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12], we summarize the major 
challenges in the secure satellite services with smart grid 
applications as follows: 
 Implementing IPsec for satellite networking; secure 
IP over satellite remains challenging with regard to 
key/policy management and traditional 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication security 
objectives. Our deployment aims to provide a secure 
group management platform through TCP/IP over 
satellite for smart grid applications. 
 Communication protocols with a large number of 
message exchanges in the satellite systems are 
obstacles. Therefore, it is essential for any group 
management protocol in the satellite networking 
system to be evaluated in terms of the protocol 
message signaling. Too talkative protocols can end up 
with DoS for resource-constrained smart 
meter/satellite system. 
 Broadcast nature of satellite networking jeopardizes 
the safety of the communications by leaving it at risk 
from eavesdropping attacks. Our results later 
demonstrate how eavesdropping risk is eliminated 
thanks to the IPsec as the heart of the secure group 
management protocol. 
 Provisioning satellite multicast security by addressing 
the ambiguities pertaining to the key/policy 
management is difficult. Secure multicasting over 
satellite here is equivalent to the scoped broadcasting 
which targets a specific group/domain for smart grid 
applications. 
 For a given management platform of the smart grid 
application, members such as meter aggregation 
routers can be divided logically/geographically 
/cryptographically into different domains/groups/sub-
groups and thus group-key management is needed. 
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
has a series of standards on substation automation 
within the smart grid (the automation of data 
acquisition and protection within substations) in 
which Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI [13]) 
secures the distribution of domain keys while IPsec 
[4] ensures the IP multicast protection using these 
group keys (IEC 61850) [14]. That’s why our 
emulation exploits GDOI as the secure group 
management protocol over satellite to effect group-
based encryption which governs the centralized 
key/policy distribution mechanism. 
IV. FIXED-NETWORK SCENARIO WITH SMART GRID 
Figure 1 displays the fixed-network scenario similar to 
our previous work in [2]. With the fixed-network scenario 
whereby terminals are meter aggregation nodes with low 
join/leave characteristics, cryptographic goals such as 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication are less 
problematic. This additionally makes our implementation 
scenario herein more suitable for smart grid applications. 
This is because while security undoubtedly incurs costs, less 
dynamic groups incur less workload on the overall satellite 
system which is desirable. Since the workload for the group 
key/policy management decreases the overall performance of 
the satellite systems and asks for redundant energy, we later 
evaluate our implementation for the cryptographic group 
management protocol to highlight the protocol message 
signaling for the smart grid scenario.  
The fixed-network scenario involves three domains, 
namely satellite domain and domains 1 & 2. Domains 1 & 2 
can be logically/geographically/cryptographically separated. 
Terminals/meters are linked to the meter aggregation nodes 
which in turn aggregate data. Meter aggregation routers are 
connected to the external networks through gateways. While 
in Figure 1, domains 1 & 2 are physically separated, 
aggregation routers in both domains can constitute the 
creation of another logical domain with a different 
encryption/decryption algorithm or different key size (to 
form the management platform of the grid application like 
SCADA for instance). In this case, the adaptive group key 
management in the satellite domain is asked to provide a 
different set of group key/policy dynamically for the 
established domain. Lastly, gateway as the entry/exit point 
provides the connectivity to the satellite domain.  
The satellite domain facilitates the centralized key 
management and policy provisioning through GDOI for 
smart grid applications. Inside the satellite domain, 
encrypted data with different keys for each domain is 
distributed with the aid of a data distributor. The different 
keys by which the group data inside the domain is encrypted 
are called Traffic Encryption Key (TEK). Each domain is 
also associated with a Key Encryption Key (KEK) to manage 
and distribute TEKs which is known as the group key 
common to the members of the given group/domain. The key 
management server facilitates KEK dissemination amongst 
the domains.  
Policy decision point (PDP) fulfills the need of the policy 
server which delegates trust through generating/distributing a 
policy token to different domains. Policy is exploited to 
effect the adaptable security remedy to fluctuating security 
situations such as when a key is compromised. Furthermore, 
policy defines the re-keying conditions— an example of 
which is deployed later. Remember that both PDP as well as 
the key management server are located in the satellite 
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domain which disseminates the keying materials and policy 
tokens to intended domains. 
A. Role of GDOI within the Satellite Domain 
Secure group management protocol amongst involving 
entities in the Figure 1 scenario such as key/policy servers, 
data distributors, etc. can be satisfied with either Group 
Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP) 
[15] or GDOI [13].  Nonetheless, GDOI was standardized for 
the substation automation in the smart grid applications to 
provide secure group key distribution. GDOI also is widely 
considered as an encryption technology for next-generation 
WAN that lets trusted members of a group take advantage of 
a common SA (Security Association) which is independent 
of any endpoint IPsec tunneling relations. Whereas in 
traditional IPsec VPN tunnels the tunnel overlays routing 
(with a new IP header as the original packet) has left 
multicast replication inefficient, in secure group management 
with GDOI, highly scalable and dynamic connectivity is 
provisioned via IP header preservation. GDOI operates over 
any underlying routing infrastructure via a single unique SA 
shared for the entire group. Traditionally, it was O (N^2) for 
the number of individual SAs required for peer-to-peer IPsec 
tunnels which is extremely costly for satellite services. 
GDOI provides a means of keying protocol for secure 
group management in which IPsec guarantees 
encryption/decryption services for data packets. In other 
words, secure group management lets domain routers 
encrypt multicast/unicast data packets removing the legacy 
need to fixed VPN tunnels used to protect the traffic. GDOI 
functions amongst a set of group members (GM) and a set of 
(for high availability and resiliency) group controllers/key 
servers (KS). ISAKMP [16] (Internet Security Association 
and Key Management Protocol) phase 1 SA ensures the 
security of GDOI communications itself. In other words, 
ISAKMP (more precisely Internet Key Exchange (IKE) v1 
and v2 [17]) provides a secure key exchange mechanism and 
establishes a secure channel between GM and KS. Note that 
ISAKMP/IKE phase 1 SA (formed for each GM-KS pair) is 
different from GDOI/group SA (single and shared for the 
group/domain). KS is responsible for establishing SAs with 
group members provided that they are authorized. This 
mechanism allows merely the trusted members such as meter 
aggregation nodes or smart grid management platform 
components to address the group in our minds. Moreover, 
the KS maintains keying materials for each group along with 
the associated policies. Policies in addition to relevant 
keying materials are obtained from key servers by GMs. To 
put this into effect, initially a GM is required to register with 
a KS providing group ID to gain the group SA required to 
speak to the group. The registration makes authentication as 
well as authorization of group members possible for the KS. 
GM is now able to download the group IPsec policy as well 
as the keys needed for encrypting/decrypting 
multicast/unicast data over the established IKE phase 1 SA. 
Encrypted IP multicast packets with the aid of IPsec can be 
exchanged among GMs now. 
GDOI adds two new ISAKMP/IKE Phase 2 exchanges 
namely GROUPKEY-PULL and GROUPKEY-PUSH in 
addition to new payload definitions to the standard ISAKMP 
protocol. With Pull protocol, GM contacts KS initially to 
retrieve group SA (representing group keying 
materials/policies) over the IKE Phase 1 encrypted and 
authenticated channel (SA) for secure group 
communications. On the other hand, KS initiates the Push 
rekey protocol exchange dispatched to the group IP multicast 
address (if multicast approach is chosen for the rekeying 
mechanism; rekeying in unicast is preferred due to the added 
security achieved) to deliver fresh group keying 
materials/policies to the authorized GMs only. This in turn 
might result in de-authorization of some GMs whereby they 
cannot participate in the secure group communications 
anymore (by not receiving a new rekey). New payload 
definitions with GDOI therefore include KEK, TEK, Group 
Associated Policy, Sequence Number, etc. KS listens on port 
848 for GDOI Pull exchanges and might dispatch Push 
exchanges over the same port. In summary, with the aid of 
Pull exchanges, TEK and KEK are downloaded over 
ISAKMP/IKE phase 1 SA’s protection while Push facilitates 
the rekeying mechanism. GM-to-GM secure communication 
is now provided thanks to the IPsec ESP as the data security 
payload. 
From the architectural viewpoint, the centralized key and 
policy distribution mechanism with GDOI in Figure 1 allows 
KS to propagate keying materials as well as policies to 
already-authenticated GMs such as meter aggregation nodes, 
gateways or SCADA components to fulfill their secure site-
to-site transmission goal. Centralized key management 
architecture benefits from ease of maintenance as well as 
scalable distribution for keying materials and policies. 
V. SYSTEM REALISATION AND RESULTS 
Graphical Network Simulator version 3 (GNS3) [18] has 
been utilized for the emulation work at this stage. GNS3 
application is open source software which is free as well as 
platform independent and therefore available to be used with 
various types of operating systems including Windows, 
MacOS and Linux. GNS3 involves Dynamips; the core 
program that facilitates the Cisco IOS emulation (IOS-
internetworking operating system, a software program for 
routing, switching, internetworking and telecommunicating 
of real network elements such as routers and switches). 
While Dynagen is the text-based front-end for Dynamips, 
GNS3 provides the graphical front-end for the emulation. 
GNS3 allows for emulation of different platforms and 
technologies including Cisco, Juniper, ATM, Frame Relay, 
etc. Besides, GSN3 emulates complex network scenarios. 
However, the emulator is highly memory intensive and 
therefore prone to systematic crashing. 
  The merit of this work is that GNS3 bridges between 
simulated parameters and the actual production environment 
characteristics with performing emulation rather than 
simulation. When satellite is in place, resource constraints 
are of immense significance and thus emulated analyses here 
are more precise and thus preferred.  Particularly, 
minimizing signaling overhead introduced by any security 
mechanism and reducing the workload on the satellite 
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system is essential. Our objectives for system realization 
include but are not limited to: 
 Proper deployment of centralized secure group 
management protocol with GDOI; this should clarify 
ambiguities regarding the policy, IKE SA, group SA, 
keying/rekeying materials and conditions, and access-
list protection of the remote sites/group address of the 
grid applications. 
 Thwarting the eavesdropping risks associated with 
(the broadcast nature of) the satellite systems as well 
as smart grid applications 
 Measuring the signaling overhead pertaining to GDOI 
placed in the satellite domain as the secure group 
management protocol under accurate emulation 
conditions utilizing flow-graph of Wireshark [19], we 
evaluate the signaling overhead required for each 
group member through GDOI to authenticate itself to 
the key server for the basic scenario. 
 Future work aims at estimating the overhead added 
by data security payload with ESP as the heart of 
GDOI before and after cryptographic group 
management protocol implementation; this reveals 
the added workload on the satellite system for the 
basic scenario. 
A. Implementation Scenario 
Figure 2 displays the emulation topology with GNS3 for 
a single logical domain established upon varying 
heterogeneous networks. GDOI as the secure group 
management protocol is implemented within the satellite 
domain. Domains 1, 2 & 3 are geographically/physically 
separated over a large area. 
 
Fig. 2. Emulation scenario with GNS3, a single logical domain is chosen 
upon heterogeneous networks to form a smart grid application for 
instance. 
Recall that while IKE ensures pair-wise security 
associations between various peers, GDOI utilizing IKE 
phase 1 between each GM and KS ends up with a single and 
common SA amongst all GMs. Additional to pair-wise SAs 
with IKE phase 1, GDOI also “interprets” ISAKMP/IKE to 
come up with a single SA for the group security domain. 
Simply put, as the foundation of the secure group 
management solution, GDOI defines single ISAKMP 
Domain of Interpretation (DOI). By the same token, for 
cryptographically heterogeneous domains, we propose 
multiple DOIs to be defined and implemented with GDOI 
residing in the satellite domain in a similar way. Also, thanks 
to the GDOI IPsec, the data security is implemented in a 
layer in the protocol stack, which is common to all satellite, 
UMTS, WiMAX, etc. domains, that is desired. GDOI 
messages perform creation, deletion and maintenance of SAs 
established amongst authenticated and authorized GMs. KS 
rekeys the group before current keys (downloaded at the time 
of registration by GMs) expiration. This means that to avoid 
expiration of keys, the KS is also asked to provide rekeying 
for the group by pushing the rekey message down to GMs. 
This message entails the new IPsec policy and keys to be 
used upon expiration of the previous keys. For an up-to-date 
version of keying materials, the rekey message is supposed 
to be dispatched before the current SA expires. 
According to Figure 2, the switch within the cloud (SW1) 
represents the underlying infrastructure; be it satellite link/air 
interface or a leased wired private WAN link. This implies 
that regardless of what the core technology and underlying 
networking infrastructure/medium is (namely satellite, IP or 
Internet cloud, private WAN, MPLS, ATM or Frame Relay), 
GDOI meets the expectations (platform-independent). R1 
acts as the KS as well as PDP illustrated in Figure 1 here 
(Cisco IOS on R1 is capable of being coded as a server). R2, 
R3 and finally R4 are our GMs which are required to share 
the same SA under a single DOI with GDOI to communicate 
securely. GMs can be thought of as the meter aggregation 
nodes in Figure 1. They will be in possession of a single 
unique group key for the established group (i.e. this is KEK, 
KEK is also called group key, and the group key encrypts 
TEK which in turn decrypts application data). Note that KS 
as well as PDP are located in the satellite domain to enable 
adaptive and scalable group key management for multiple 
DOIs.  
We assigned IPs within the same subnet for all the 
interfaces facing SW1 from the range 10.0.0.0/24. Therefore, 
R1’s interface is assigned with 10.0.0.254/24, R2’s with 
10.0.0.1/24, R3’s with 10.0.0.2/24 and R4’s with 
10.0.0.3/24. Loopback interfaces are required to represent 
the subscribers into IGMP [20] for the multicast group (for a 
given smart grid application for instance) and thus 
10.100.0.1/32, 10.100.0.2/32 and finally 10.100.0.3/32 are 
configured on the loopback interface number 0 on R2, R3 
and R4 respectively. We then configured PIM Sparse Mode 
[21] for multicast routing on all the GMs. Additionally, R2 is 
set to play the role of the Rendezvous Point (RP) for the 
multicast routing protocol. Multicast channel 239.1.2.3 is 
also contacted by IGMP subscribers, i.e. GMs’ loopbacks for 
instance. Lastly, OSPF is configured in the background to 
ensure full IP connectivity and reachability. 
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B. Emulation Results 
We first emulate the ISAKMP session between each GM 
and the KS so that GM authenticates itself initially and the 
admission control is performed. Here, the pre-shared key 
(PSK) approach which is cryptographically lighter for peer 
authentication is preferred over Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) since resource constraints of satellite service are 
considered. However, a limited number of the IKE 
interactions at the end are merely involved for each GM-to-
KS registration and thus the implementation is still scalable. 
IPsec SA parameters are afterwards defined which determine 
the traffic protection policy on the KS. This includes which 
traffic (via an Access Control List - ACL) needs protection 
and the  algorithm/method that meets the given 
authentication/integrity/encryption requirements. Last but 
not least, the rekeying policy such as rekeying method 
(unicast or multicast), key lifetime and the retransmission 
rate are addressed on the KS. GMs can now (mutually) 
authenticate the KS and subsequently join the DOI.  
By finishing the registration of GMs into the KS, on the 
KS, we list the GMs which have Active status for the DOI to 
verify the correct GDOI implementation. Remember that the 
ISAKMP session between the GM and KS (illustrated by 
GDOI_IDLE) will time out after the configured ISAKMP 
lifetime. This is because an ISAKMP/IKE session is only 
needed for the initial registration and does not need to stay 
up for normal secure group management operation. A rekey 
SA (indicated by GDOI_REKEY state) however always 
stays in the IKE database. The result is displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Confirming the current IKE SA on the KS after registration; each 
SA, assigned with the distinct connection ID in Active Status for (KS, 
GM) pair, is currently in GDOI_IDLE state. 
Upon accomplishment of the registration phase, we next 
verify GDOI IPsec SA (not IKE SA discussed above) on R4 
as the GM and its session status to confirm proper group 
IPsec SA establishment belonging to our DOI. Remember 
that this is where the network has already converged after a 
while. Convergence means that there is no added multicast 
traffic except the scenarios’ default ones including PIM, 
IGMP, etc. TEK as part of the IPsec SA then encrypts the 
data for the DOI while KEK facilitates the rekey before 
IPsec expires or upon new policies being enforced.  
According to Figure 4, we observe that while we have 
not pushed down any ACL for specifying the interesting 
traffic (which needs to be secured) or determined any 
protection policy on the R4 as a GM, upon registration into 
the KS, GDOI IPsec SA for the DOI including policy as well 
as ACL is successfully downloaded from the KS and 
installed on the GM. Consequently, R4 then encrypts any 
traffic destined for other GMs of the DOI group or multicast 
address defined earlier based on the ACL associated with the 
GDOI SA. 
We then verify the ISAKMP policy defined on the KS (in 
addition to the default policy). With the non-default IKE 
policy with priority 1, DES is the encryption algorithm, 
SHA-1 is the hash algorithm utilized, PSK is exploited as the 
means of authentication method, Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 
identifier is set to 2 within the policy and finally lifetime of 
the IKE SA is set to 86400 seconds (can be tuned based on 
the traffic volume as well). This is revealed in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Verifying GDOI IPsec SA corresponding to the DOI group on R4, 
as the GM, downloaded from the KS; GDOI IPsec SA’s associated 
ACL dictates encrypting both GM-to-GM as well as GM-to-Multicast 
traffic within the group. 
 
Fig. 5. Group SA Policy is verified on the KS; that is algorithms, methods 
and thresholds which include encryption, hash, authentication, DH 
group identifier and lifetime within the IKE policy. 
As soon as the lifetime of the first SA expires (the first 
1800 seconds elapse), on the KS’s console, we are informed 
that the first rekey is sent with sequence number 1. This 
informational syslog will also indicate the value of the IPsec 
Security Parameter Index (SPI). The substantial observation 
is that this SPI is shared amongst all the GMs for this DOI. 
We can now expect the proper receipt of the first rekey 
messages on the GMs dispatched from 10.0.0.254. This can 
be verified immediately on the GMs’ consoles as Figure 6 
for R4 highlights. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Strong security incurs costs and as a result most of the 
security proposals significantly increase the performance 
overheads. Here, we evaluate the added overhead of the 
emulated secure group management implementation for our 
satellite scenario with three GMs and one KS aiming at 
quantifying the burden imposed by the protocol in terms of 
the protocol message signaling. We examine the relevant 
Wireshark flow graph to highlight the secure group 
management protocol’s message signaling overhead in 
reality for the scenario. The screenshot depicted at the 
bottom of Figure 7 is where R4 starts registering into the KS 
with the aid of GDOI. Accordingly, six plus four 
bidirectional messages are detected initially, exchanged for 
both phases (GDOI IPsec Phase 1 and Phase 2) in total. 
Afterwards, any communications from R4 destined for either 
any multicast addresses (presented here by PIM protocol 
messages, IGMP protocol messages) or other GMs (GM-to-  
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 Fig. 6. R4’s console upon the receipt of the first rekey for the group from the KS. The SPI shared for the group is 999D3F786C16F07E which is the same for the 
entire DOI. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Top: message signalling overhead for the secure group management protocol whereby R4 registers with the KS are detected by Wireshark, 4+6 messages 
are exchanged over UDP for effecting GDOI's IPsec phase 1 & 2 in total. Bottom: whereas before GDOI is in place all R4-to-GMs or R4-to-multicast-
groups communications were in plaintext/unencrypted/analyzable by eavesdropper and thus unsecured, with GDOI they are all ESP protected. 
GM) are encrypted and thus ESP protected. Additionally, our 
results here confirm that the entire domain/group 
communications (be it GM-to-GM or GM-to-Multicast 
Addresses) are secured/encrypted with the same SPI (SPI is 
sent in plaintextand thus is detectable) which is shared across 
the whole DOI. Figure 7 on the top, however, stresses the 
fact that the entire communications sourced from/destined 
for R4 before the GM joins the DOI were in plaintext 
(eavesdropping was feasible as the vulnerability pinpointed 
in section III), unencrypted (and therefore analyzable with 
Wireshark) and thus unsecured. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Security has been one of the obstacles for both satellite 
services as well as smart grid group applications such as 
SCADA, Teleprotection or Security Surveillance, especially 
with logical/geographical/cryptographic domains spanning 
heterogeneous networks and regions. Innovative security 
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architecture was proposed and deployed in this paper to 
clarify the security challenges, with a particular focus on the 
secure multicast key management and policy provisioning. A 
fixed network scenario was presented for the smart grid 
group applications over satellites. For such centralized 
architecture, the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) 
was deployed and critically evaluated in terms of the added 
signaling overhead in a basic scenario. The experimental 
results confirmed that the eavesdropping risks were 
eliminated thanks to the cryptographic group management 
protocol, while the analyzed protocol message signaling 
overhead in practice does not seem to act as much of a 
deterrent for the solution adoption.  
Future work aims in addition at estimating the overhead 
added by data security payload with ESP as the heart of 
GDOI before and after cryptographic group management 
protocol implementation; this reveals the added workload on 
the satellite system for the basic scenario which demonstrates 
how the proposed solution scales with the increase in the 
number of groups/GMs. 
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